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Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs APT31 cyber-espionage

The Czech government publicly attributed a years-long cyber-espionage campaign against an unclassified network of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to APT31, a group linked to China's Ministry of State Security. The intrusion, active since at least 2022, targeted designated critical national infrastructure.

Victim
Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs

On 28 May 2025, the Czech government publicly attributed a sustained cyber-espionage campaign against its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to APT31, a state-backed threat actor associated with China's Ministry of State Security. The attribution — backed by the EU and NATO — marked one of the most significant Czech public callouts of Chinese state hacking to date.

What happened

According to the Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB) and a joint government statement, the malicious activity began no later than 2022 and targeted one of the unclassified networks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — an institution designated as Czech critical infrastructure. APT31 (also tracked as Zirconium and Judgment Panda) has a long record of targeting government and political entities across EU and NATO states for intelligence collection.

The intrusion was uncovered and assessed through an extensive joint investigation conducted by the Czech Security Information Service (BIS), Military Intelligence, the Office for Foreign Relations and Information, and NÚKIB, which concluded with a high degree of certainty that APT31 was responsible.

Impact

  • The compromise affected an unclassified network of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, meaning the most sensitive classified systems were reportedly not breached.
  • As an espionage operation, the campaign aimed at intelligence collection rather than disruption — there was no ransom, no data dump, and no operational outage.
  • The targeting of a foreign ministry's diplomatic communications carried significant national-security and counter-intelligence implications.

International response

The attribution drew immediate diplomatic backing. EU member states and NATO allies expressed solidarity with the Czech Republic and unanimously called on China to behave responsibly and adhere to the UN norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace to which it had voluntarily committed. The EU's senior diplomatic leadership condemned the campaign as a clear and unacceptable violation of international norms. The Czech Republic summoned China's ambassador in protest.

Why it matters

The case exemplifies the trend of public attribution as a strategic tool: rather than responding covertly, the Czech Republic chose to name APT31 openly, marshalling allied support to impose diplomatic and reputational costs on a state sponsor. It reinforced that diplomatic ministries are persistent espionage targets, that even unclassified networks hold intelligence value, and that coordinated EU/NATO attribution has become a core instrument of Western cyber statecraft.

Timeline

  1. Malicious cyber activity against an unclassified network of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs begins, later attributed to APT31.

  2. A joint investigation by Czech intelligence services and NÚKIB works to identify the actor and secure the compromised network.

  3. The Czech government publicly attributes the campaign to APT31, associated with China's Ministry of State Security.

  4. EU member states and NATO allies issue statements of solidarity, calling on China to adhere to UN norms of responsible state behaviour.

  5. The Czech Republic summons the Chinese ambassador in protest over the attack.

Sources

  1. nukib.gov.czhttps://nukib.gov.cz/en/infoservis-en/news/2263-the-czech-government-has-publicly-attributed-cyberattacks-to-china-actor-apt31-linked-to-the-chinese-ministry-of-state-security-has-targeted-the-infrastructure-of-the-czech-ministry-of-foreign-affairs/
  2. mzv.gov.czhttps://mzv.gov.cz/jnp/en/issues_and_press/press_releases/statement_by_the_government_of_the_czech.html
  3. bleepingcomputer.comhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/czechia-blames-china-for-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-cyberattack/
  4. securityaffairs.comhttps://securityaffairs.com/178399/apt/czech-republic-accuses-chinas-apt31-of-a-cyberattack-on-its-foreign-ministrys-unclassified-network.html

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